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TAX LAW 
GOOD FAITH AND THE FRAUDULENT 
CONVEYANCE ACT 
I. INTRJDUCTION 
In Mayors v. Commissioner l , the Ninth Circuit applied Cal-
ifornia law and held that the transfer of a house between cohabi-
tants in exchange for past services was supported by fair consid-
eration.2 Even though the transferor was insolvent, the parties' 
good faith belief in the existence of the transferee's rights, ren-
dered the transfer not fraudulent.lI Therefore, the transferee was 
not liable for the transferor's tax liability.· 
II. FACTS 
In 1971, appellant, Susan Mayors ("Mayors") worked as a 
secretary/receptionist in the office of Dr. Joseph A. Averna 
("Averna")II. Mayors and Averna became emotionally involved 
and began living together, but did not marry.s While living to-
gether Mayors and Averna did not hold themselves out as a 
married couple and kept their financial affairs separate.' Mayors 
continued to work in Averna's office as a secretary/book-keeper 
and X-ray' technician, and she also kept house for him.- Averna 
did not pay Mayors for her household services but gave her 
funds for basic living expenses and for special needs as they 
1. 785 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1986) (per Wiggins, J.; the other panel members were An-
derson, J. and Pregerson, J.). 
2. Id. at 761. 
3.Id. 
4.Id. 
5. Id. at 758. 
6.Id. 
7. Id. at 759. 
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arose. II 
In June, 1973, Mayors gave birth to their daughter Antoi-
nette. In anticipation of the birth of Antoinette, A verna bought 
a residence at 1970 A von Lane, Spring Valley, California for 
$32,500.00.10 The deed conveyed the property to A verna, "a sin-
gle man."ll In 1977 Averna refinanced the property for 
$52,000.00, giving a deed of trust as security for the propel·ty 
and signing a note making him personally liable for the 
repayment. 12 
In December, 1978, Mayors and Averna separated.13 At the 
time of their separation, Mayors and Averna reached an oral 
agreement regarding division of their property; Averna would 
transfer the Avon Lane property to Mayors and would provide 
$500.00 per month child support. H 
On February 20, 1979, Averna transferred the property to 
Mayors by quit-claim deed, with no cash consideration. 1 II At the 
time of the transfer, the property was worth $90,000.00 and was 
encumbered by the 1977 deed of trust with a remaining loan bal-
ance of $51,450.00.18 At the time of the transfer, Averna was in-
solvent17 to the extent of $69,627.93.18 
Averna made the first four payments on the loan after the 
transfer in lieu of the child support payments. III He failed to 
make the next two loan payments. Mayors then paid the delin-
quent installments, and the penalties to bring the account cur-
9. Id. at 758·59. Avema paid her below market wages for her work in his office. ld. 
10. Id. at 758. 
11. Id. 
12.Id. 
13. Id. Mayors and Antoinette continued to live at the Avon Lane residence up to 
the time of trial. ld. 
14. Id. at 759. 
15.Id. 
16. ld. As a result, Mayors received a transfer of equity of $38,550.00, while Averna 
remained personally liable on the loan to the bank. Id. 
17. Insolvency as defined in the Cal. Civ. Code provides in relevant part: "A person 
is insolvent when the present fair salable value of his assets is less than the amount that 
will be required to pay his probable liability on his existing debts as they become abso-
lute and matured." Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.02(a) (West 1970). 
18. Mayors v. Commissioner, 785 F.2d at 759 (9th Cir. 1986). 
19.Id. 
2
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rent.20 Mayors made all subsequent payments and put the prom-
issory note in her own name.21 Averna made additional child 
support payments directly to Mayors totaling $699.00, then 
stopped completely.22 Mayors thereafter threatened to sue 
Averna for the discontinued child support payments.2S 
Subsequently, on April 12, 1982, after unsuccessfully at-
tempting to collect tax deficiencies on Averna's 1977 and 1978 
personal income tax, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is-
sued Mayors a notice that she was liable as a transferee for pay-
ment of Averna's tax liability.24 
Mayors petitioned the U.S. Tax Court, arguing that the 
transfer of the house was in settlement of a pre-existing debt, 
which constituted fair consideration.25 The Tax Court rejected 
her argument finding that the transfer was not supported by fair 
consideration and thus, that Mayors was liable for A verna's tax 
liabilities.1I The Tax Court reasoned that because Mayors failed 
to prove the value of services rendered, she did not demonstrate 
that A verna was obligated to her under the principles relating to 
non-marital partners,27 as ennunciated in Marvin v. Marvin. 28 
Mayors appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
III. BACKGROUND 
Section 6901(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides a 
procedure for the collection of an existing tax liability from an 





24. ld. The Commissioner's determination of Mayor's liability was based on 26 
U.S.C. § 6901(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, see infra note 29 and accompanying text. 
25. Mayors v. Commissioner, 785 F.2d at 759-61 (9th Cir_ 1986). 
26. Mayors v. Commissioner, para. 84,401 T.C.M. (P-H 1984). 
27.ld. 
28. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 (1976), see infra note 48 and 
accompanying text. 
29. 26 U.S.C. § 6901(a) (1982), states: 
(a) Method of Collection. The amounts of the following liabili-
ties shall, except as hereinafter in this section provided, be as-
sessed, paid, and collected in the same manner and subject to 
the same provisions and limitations as in the case of the taxes 
3
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payers from avoiding payment of taxes through a transfer of as-
sets that the Internal Revenue Service could otherwise attach to 
satisfy tax deficiencies.ao 
State law governs the extent of a transferee's actual liability 
under section 6901 (a) as denoted in Commissioner v. Stern. al 
Under California Civil Code section 3439.04, a conveyance made 
by a person who is, or will be thereby rendered insolvent is 
fraudulent as to other creditors, such as the I.R.S., without re-
gard to his actual intent, if the conveyance is made without fair 
consideration.as In Headen v. Miller,aa the court stated that a 
fraudulent conveyance to creditors may be set aside.M Fair con-
sideration as defined in the California Civil Code, is that which is 
given for property, which when exchanged is a fair equivalent, or 
not disproportionately small to that property, with the underly-
ing notion of good faith.all 
1d. 
with respect to which liabilities were incurred: 
(1) Income, estata and gift taxes. 
(A) Transferees. The liability, at law or in equity, 
of a transferee of property-
(i) of a taxpayer in the case of a tax imposed 
by subtitle A (relating to income taxes) 
30. Mayors v. Commissioner, 785 F.2d at 759 (9th Cir. 1986). 
31. 357 U.S. 39, 42-45 (1958). In determining the liability of a transferee of property 
under § 311 of the 1934 Journal Revenue Code, the Supreme Court that the existence 
and extent of liability should be determined by stata law. See, e.g., Eyler v. Commis-
sioner, 760 F.2d 1129r 1132 (11th Cir. 1985). 
32. Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04 (West 1970), states: "Every conveyance made and every 
obligation incurred by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent 
as to creditors without regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made or the obli-
gation is incurred without a fair consideration." 1d.' 
33. 141 Cal. App. 3d 169, 190 Cal. Rptr. 198 (1983). 
34. 1d. at 172, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 200. The court stated the general rule in California 
that a conveyance by an insolvent person of an asset to another without fair considera-
tion is in fraud of creditors. The creditors' remedies depend upon whether the claim has 
matured and include: setting the conveyance aside. 1d. 
1d. 
35. Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.03 (West 1970), provides: 
Fair consideration is that given for property or obiigation: 
(a) When in exchange for such property, or obligation, as a 
fair equivalent, and in good faith, property is conveyed or an 
antecedent debt is satisfied, or 
(b) When such property, or obligation is received in good faith 
to secure a present advance or antecedent debt in the amount 
not disproportionately small as compared with the value of 
property, or obligation obtained. 
4
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Good faith in California is discussed in Bank of California 
v. Virtue & Scheck, Inc.," a fraudulent conveyance case also in-
volving fair consideration under California Civil Code section 
3439.03.37 The Scheck court noted that the essential issue was 
whether the entire transaction was enacted in good faith." IT the 
parties in good faith believed that the promise was binding, then 
the consideration was valid. U The mere possibility that the 
promise may not have been legally enforceable was irrelevant to 
the essential issue of good faith.40 
In California there are several precedents supporting the 
general proposition that forbearance to exercise a legal right is 
sufficient consideration. In Coldwell Banker & Co. v. Pepper 
Tree Office Center Associates,U the court so held.42 The Cold-
well court also noted that basic contract law recognizes that for-
bearance to exercise a legal right is sufficient consideration.4S In 
Healy v. Brewster," it was held that forbearance to press a 
claim or promise to forbear may be sufficient consideration even 
though the claim was wholly ill-founded!a In Silver v. Sheman-
ski,48 the court held that a compromise of a doubtful right is a 
sufficient foundation for an agreement.47 
36. 140 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 190 Cal. Rptr. 54 (1983). In determining the relative 
rights of a corporation's creditors to proceeds resulting from liquidation, the court held 
that the conveyance of a mortgage from the corporation to its president was fraudulent 
as to creditors. ld. at 1026, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 54. 
37. See ,upra note 35 and accompanying text. 
38. 140 Cal App. 3d 1026, 1040, 190 Cal. Rptr. 54, 64 (1983). 
39. ld. 
40. ld. at 1041, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 64. 
41. 106 Cal App. 3d 272, 165 Cal Rptr. 51 (1980) relJ'd in part, on other ground8, 
178 Cal. App. 3d 960, 224 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1986). (Broker sought commissions for leases 
between building operator and tenants; held, agreement was modified as to preclude bro-
ker from obtaining commissions on such leases). Ide 
42. Ide at 280, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 56. 
43. Ide 
44. 251 Cal. App. 2d 541, 59 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1967). The court held that the promise 
of a general contractor to pay an earthwork subcontractor the reasonable value of the 
extra work required by mutual mistake as to soil composition, was supported by ade-
quate consideration where the lIubcontractor relied upon such a promise in forbearing 
reclssion and in performing such extra work. Ide at 541, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 752. 
45. ld. at 551, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 758. 
46. 89 Cal. App. 2d 520, 201 P.2d 418 (1949). The court held valid a compromise 
agreement that settled a dispute over property disposed of in accordance with decedent'll 
will ld. at 520, 201 P.2d at 418. 
47. ld. at 531, 201 P.2d at 426. 
5
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That a nonmarital partner has enforceable property rights 
against his or her former partner was established in California in 
Marvin v. Marvin.·' A non-marital partner may recover for the 
reasonable value of household services rendered if he or she can 
show that the services were rendered with the expectation of a 
monetary award." The California Supreme Court in Marvin 
based its opinion on the principle that adults who voluntarily 
live together are as competent as any other persons to contract 
respecting earnings and property rights. 50 
Under 26 U.S.C. section 6902(a), the Commissioner has the 
burden of proving the liability of a transferee.51 Once the Com-
missioner establishes a prima facie case of fraudulent convey-
ance by showing that the transfer was made by one who was 
insolvent,51 the transferee then bears the burden of proving that 
the transfer was for fair consideration. 53 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and remanded 
with directiuns to enter judgment for Mayors.54 The Ninth Cir-
cuit found that the Tax Court had misconstrued the nature of 
Mayors' claim that there was adequate consideration by focus-
sing on proof of the actual value and viability of the Marvin-
type65 claim Mayors may have lUld against Averna." The Ninth 
Circuit stated that whether Mayc.rs actually had an enforceable 
right against A verna was irrelev'mt if Mayors and A verna be-
48. In Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684-85, 134 Cal. Rptr_ 815, 831-32, 557 P.2d 
106, 122-23 (1976), the court held that a non-marital partner may recover in quantum 
meruit (or the reasonable value of household services rendered less the reasonable value 
o( support received. ld. 
49.ld. 
50. Ide at 674, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825, 557 P.2d at 116. 
51. 26 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (1982) states: "Burden of proof - In proceedings before the 
Tax Court the burden of proof shall be upon the SecretarY or his delegate to show that It 
petitioner is liable as a transferee of property of It taxpayer •••• " Ide 
52. See &upra note 17. 
53. Kirkland V. Risso, 98 Cal. App. 3d 971, 977-78. 159 Cal. Rptr. 798, 801-02 (1980). 
The Kirkland court held that the transferee, brother, had the burden of proof to estab-
lish that the conveyance was supported by fair consideration, after having conceded that 
the transferor was insolvent. ld. 
54. Mayors V. Commissioner, 785 F.2d at 761-62 (9th Cir. 1986). 
55. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
56. Mayors, 785 F.2d at 761. 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol17/iss1/12
1987] TAX LAW 155 
lieved in good faith that she had such a right and that the trans-
fer was made to satisfy it or "in exchange for her forbearance 
from enforcing it. &7 
The Ninth Circuit focused on basic contract law concepts to 
support its holding that the Tax Court misconstrued the nature 
of Mayors' claim. n The court examined two aspects of contract 
law which are deemed sufficient consideration in Calif't)rnia: a 
good faith belief that one has an enforceable right and that a 
transfer is made in exchange for it; and in the alternative, for-
bearance from enforcing such right. &e 
To support the good faith concept; the Ninth Circuit relied 
on Bank of California v. Virtue & Scheck, Inc .. eo The Scheck 
court held that the essential issue was good faith and that 
whether the promise was legally enforceable was irrelevant.el 
The Ninth Circuit interpreted California law to mean that the 
parties' good faith belief in the existence of a valid claim was the 
essential issue and not whether Mayors actually had a valid 
claim. U Therefore, the Ninth Circuit disregarded the Tax 
Court's analysis of the validity of Mayors' claim altogether, as 
the validity was irrelevant. 51 
The essential issue for the Ninth Circuit was whether May-
·ors and Averna believed in good faith that Mayors had an en-
forceable right against Avema." The Ninth Circuit found good 
faith belief by showing that there was no evidence of bad faith. 
It held that the lack of an overt threat to sue A vema or the 
filing of a suit did not undermine the good faith of the trans-
fer.u In fact the court thought it was commendable that Mayors 
was able to arrive at a division of property with A verna without 
resort to threats or litigation." 
57.ld. 
58. ld. Mayor·s claim was that abe bad • valid enforceable right against Averna, (as 
a non-marital partner was held to have in Marvin v_ Marvin, see supra note 48) and that 
the transfer of the Avon Lane property was made to satisfy such a right.ld. at 760-61. 
59. Mayors v. Commi&aioner. 785 F.2d at 761 (9th eire 1986). 
60. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. . 
61. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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The Ninth Circuit continued its good faith analysis finding 
that the Commissioner's claim that Mayors never intended to 
give up her rights under Marvin was unsupported by the rec-
ord.s1 Apparently, the Commissioner reasoned that if Mayor's 
did not intend to give up her rights, the transfer of property (the 
agreement) was not supported by consideration as Mayors ex-
changed nothing in return." Alternatively, the Tax Court rea-
soned that if she did not intend to give up her rights then the 
agreement was not made in good faith.u However, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that Mayors considered suing A vema only after he 
stopped making the agreed child-support payments,10 thereby 
demonstrating that Mayors considered taking action to enforce 
the original agreement.11 Apparently, the Ninth Circuit reasoned 
that Mayors did intend to give up her rights in the original 
agreement and therefore that it was made in good faith. The 
Ninth Circuit also noted that the Tax Court specifically found 
that Averna and Mayors understood that the transfer was in ex-
change for past services rendered by Mayors.1i Evidently the 
court reasoned that by believing that Mayors had property 
rights, the exchange of the property for these rights must have 
been made in good faith. Mayors claimed that the Tax Court 
erred in finding that the transfer of the Avon Lane property was 
without fair consideration.1S She noted that the Tax Court ac-
knowledged her Marvin-type claim and was willing to assume 
that any uncompensated services rendered by her to Avema 
were rendered with the expectation of compensation.1• Mayors 
argued to the Ninth Circuit that the transfer of the house was in 
settlement of this pre-existing debt, and 80 constituted fair con-
sideration.15 The Ninth Circuit did not have to consider this ar-
gument as it deemed that the validity of Mayors' claim was ir-
relevant to the fairness of the consideration, because of their 







73. Id. at 760. 
74.Id. 
75.Id. 
76. Id. at 761. 
8
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The second aspect of contract law that the court discussed 
was that MfLyors' forbearance from enforcing that right would 
also be sufficient consideration.':7 The court's analysis of this as-
pect went no further than citing many California precedents.78 
v. CRITIQUE 
The result in Mayors v. Commissioner is supported by Cali-
fornia law.'1II The Ninth Circuit cited Bank of California' v. Vir-
tue & Scheck, Inc.,'o to support its interpretation of the good 
faith element of fair consideration.81 The Scheck court defined 
good faith as an integral part of fair consideration.a2 It held that 
if the parties believed in good faith that the promise was bind-
ing, then the consideration was valid!' The Ninth Circuit di-
rectly followed the Scheck court's holding, focusing on the good 
faith of the parties in their agreeme!.lt and transfer of property." 
The Scheck court's decision is the only appellate court deci-
sion in California which has directly considered and interpreted 
the importance of good faith within California Civil Code section 
3439.03. Thus, it supports the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of 
California law. However, California law remains vague as to pre-
cisely what constitutes good faith. . 
Califcrnia Civil Code sections 3439-3439.12 represent Cali-
fornia's adoption of section 3 of the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyance Act.BII Many other states have also adopted the Uniform 
Fraudulent Conveyance Act and have interpreted good faith as 
an element of fair consideration." 
77. Mayors v. Commissioner, 785 F.2d at 761 (9th Cir. 1986), see supra notes 41, 44 
and accompanying text. 
78. rd. at 761, see supra notes 41, 44 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text. 
80. 140 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 190 Cal. Rptr. 54 (1983), see supra text accompanying 
notes 36-40. 
81. Mayors, 785 F.2d at 761. 
82. Scheck, 140 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 1035, 190 Cal. Rptr. 54, 60 (1983). 
83. rd. at 1040, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 64. 
84. Mayors, 785 F.2d at 761. 
85. Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act § 3, 7A U.L.A. (West 1985). 
86. Twenty-six states have adopted the act. For a list of the adopting states and 
corresponding state law, see 7A U.L.A. § 3 (West Supp. 1985). For a discussion of the 
act, including the good faith element, see The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in 
Pennsylvania, 5 U. Pitt. 1.. Rev. 161 (1939); Application of the Uniform Fraudulent 
9
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Bank of California v. Virtue & Scheck, Inc.,n contains the 
requested jury instructions which define good faith.88 These in-
structions are the identical words used by the Supreme Court of 
Washington in Tacoma Association of Credit Men v. Lesler/I) 
when defining good faith in the context of the Uniform Fraudu-
lent Conveyance Act.I)O The Washington Supreme Court dis-
cussed three factors in defining good faith; "(I) An honest belief 
in the propriety of the activity in question; (2) no intent to take 
unconscionable advantage of others; and (3) no intent to, or 
knowledge of the fact the activity in question will hinder, delay, 
or defraud others."!)1 A Washington appellate court following 
Tacoma stated that if any of these factors are absent, lack of 
good faith is established.1)2 Also, the Tacoma court continued; 
"[Glood faith is to be determined by looking to the intent be-
hind or the effect of a transaction, rather than to its form.''93 
The first factor in the Tacoma court's definition of good 
faith is an honest belief in the propriety of the activity in ques-
tion.l)· An agreement made in the face of separation after Averna 
and Mayors had been living together seven years mayor may 
not have been made honestly. It could depend on whether they 
Conveyance Act, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 404 (1933); for cases that discuss the element good 
faith, see Smith v. Whitman, 39 N.J. 397, 189 A.2d 15 (1963) (that transfers of debtors' 
leases were not made for fair consideration under New York law in view of lack of good 
faith, and thus, transfers made at the time debtors were insolvent); Lucking v. Barker, 
274 Mich. 103, 264 N.W. 306 (1936) (good faith of grantors and grantees is not deter-
mined by mere form of conveyance, and does not come into question unless rights of 
third parties are cut off); Huber v. Coast Inv. Co., 30 Wash. App. 804, 638 P.2d 609 
(1981) (fair consideration, under statute allowing plaintiff to have conveyance set asside 
if he can demonstrate lack of fair consideration in exchange, includes concept of good 
faith); Tacoma Ass'n of Credit Men v. Lesler, 72 Wash. 2d 453, 433 P.2d 901 (1967) 
(whether there has been good faith and whether there has been a fraudulent conveyance, 
is to be determined by looking to intent behind or effect of transaction rather than to its 
form). 
87. 140 Cal. App. 3d 1026, 190 Cal. Rptr. 54 (1983). 
88. Id. at 1035, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 60. 
89. 72 Wash. 2d 453, 458, 433 P.2d 901, 904 (1967). 
90. Washington adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act in 1945. 7A 
U.L.A. § 3 (West Supp. 1986). 
91. Tacoma, 72 Wash. 2d at 458, 433 P.2d at 904 (1967). 
92. Sparkman & McLean Co. v. Derber, 4 Wash. App. 341, 347, 481 P.2d 585, 591 
(1971), the court following Tacoma, stated: "[I]f anyone of these factors is absent, lack 
of good faith is established and the conveyance fails." Id. 
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were separating in a hostile atmosphere. A hostile atmosphere 
may tend to lead to an agreement more likely to have been 
reached in an arms-length transaction, and fairly bargained for. 
But the contrary is also likely, that the agreement was made 
simply to help Averna evade his creditors. 
The fact that there was a child involved, and that the agree-
ment was reached through Mayors' attorney does help support 
the conclusion that the agreement was made in an arms-length 
transaction. 
Mayors testified that she considered suing A verna only after 
he stopped making the agreed child-support payments.lI11 The 
Ninth Circuit stated that this merely showed that Mayors con-
sidered taking action to enforce the original agreement, not that 
Mayors did not intend the original transfer to be binding. lie The 
Court also noted that the Tax Court specifically found that 
Averna and Mayors understood that the transfer was in ex-
change for past services.1I7 
These points may demonstrate that the agreement was hon-
estly made between Averna and Mayors as they tend to illus-
trate a bargained for exchange. Thus, the first element of good 
faith does have support in the record, but without a specific dis-
'cussion and analysis by the court, it is difficult to conclude that 
the agreement was honestly made. 
The second and third elements of good faith; that there was 
no intent to take unconscionable advantage of others and that 
there was no intent to, or knowledge that the transfer would 
hinder, delay, or defraud others, are not supported in the record 
nor are they discussed by the court. Thus, the Ninth Circuit de-
parts from the better approach; fully defining and analyzing 
good faith as interpreted in the context of the Uniform Fraudu-
lent Conveyance Act.1I1 
The Ninth Circuit only considered good faith in the context 
95. Mayors v. Commissioner, 785 F.2d at 761 (9th Cir. 1986). 
96. [d. 
97. [d. 
98. Tacoma Ass'n of Credit Men v. LesIer, 72 Wash. 2d 453, 433 P.2d 901 (1967) as 
defined by the Washington Supreme Court. See supra text accompanying note 91. 
11
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of the agreement between Averna and Mayors. The California 
forbearance and good faith casesll9 and the RestatementlOO do 
support the consideration in the agreement between Averna and 
Mayors as being valid either in their "good faith" belief of May-
ors' rights or in the forbearance from enforcing those rights. But 
good faith belief as applied in the transaction between Averna 
and Mayors, and basic contract, law does not take into account 
third party creditors. such as the I.R.S., that may have been af-
fected by the transfer of property from Averna to Mayors when 
Averna was insolvent. 
Good faith should be determined with respect not only to 
Mayors and A verna, but to third party creditors as well. lol In 
Hansen v. Cramer,102 the California Supreme Court held that 
what constitutes fair consideration under the Fraudulent Con-
veyance Act must be determined from the standpoint of credi-
tors.lOS The Cramer court holding supports the theory that cred-
itors should be contemplated when analyzing fair consideration. 
The Tacoma court's definition of good faith does just that by 
looking at the intention of the parties as it affects others. lo, 
The Ninth Circuit used good faith in the strict sense as it 
applies to consideration in basic contract law. It would be 
sounder public policy to also consider good faith as against cred-
itors as well, thus protecting creditors and promoting confidence 
in contracts which in turn contributes to a healthier economy. 
This definition of good faith supports the purpose behind sec-
tion 6901(apoll of the Internal Revenue Code which is to prevent 
99. See supra notes 36-47 and accompanying text. 
100. The Restatement in relevant part, states: 
(1) Forbearance to insert the surrender of a claim or defense 
which proves to be invalid is not consideration unless; 
(a) The claim or defense is in fact doubtful because of 
uncertainty 88 to the facts or the law; or . 
(b) The forbearing or surrendering party believes that 
the claim or defense may be fairly determined to be 
valid. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 74 (1979). 
101. See supra text accompanying note 92.. 
102. 39 Cal. 2d 321, 245 P.2d 1059 (1952). Where plaintiff creditor successfully 
saught to set aside a deed given in consideration for cancellation of an antecedent debt 
owed by defendant. [d. at 321, 245 P.2d 1059. 
103. [d. at 324, 245 P.2d at 1061. 
104. See supra text accompanying note 92. 
105. 26 U.S.C. § 6901(a) (1982), see supra text accompanying note 29. 
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taxpayers from avoiding payment of taxes through transfer of 
assets. lot Transfers that are not made in good faith would be set 
aside. Over time, this result would prevent a potentially insol-
vent transferor from attempting to avoid his obligations by 
transfering away his assets to the detriment of his creditors. 
Thus, enabling these creditors to rightfully satisfy obligations 
that are due them. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit's decision that the transfer was made for 
fair consideration may have been the same even with a fully de-
veloped analysis of good faith. However, that conclusion is not 
certain. The public policy of promoting confidence in contracts 
through the protection of creditors is encouraged by a strict in-
terpretation of good faith when in the context of the Fraudulent 
Conveyance Act. 
William K. Peterson* 
106. See supra text accompanying note 30. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1988. 
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TAX SUMMARY 
THE COMMISSIONER AND SUBSTANCE 
TRIUMPH OVER FORM 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Bryant v. Commissioner,1 the Ninth Circuit held that: 
the taxpayers' basis in their beaver investment must be limited 
to the fair market value of the beavers and not the stated con-
tract price;1 the evidence supported the Tax Court's determina-
tion of fair market value;' and the assessment of additional tax 
for negligent failure to report investment tax credit was proper! 
II. FACTS 
Taxpayers Bryant, Hartman, Webber, and Wohl invested in 
domestic beavers during the 1970's. The beavers were main-
tained by ranchers on already existing ranches on behalf of the 
investors. a The investor was given a certificate for each of his 
beavers and was able to identify his animals by tatoos.' The 
ranchers charged the beaver owners a fee for feed and mainte-
nance of their beavers. '7 
All taxpayers except Bryant paid $3,500 per proven pair of 
1. 790 F.2d 1463 (9th Cit. 1986) (per Wiggens, J.; the other panel members were 
Skopil, J. and Fletcher, J.). 
2. ld. at 1466. 
3. ld. at 1467. 
4. ld. at 1468. 
5. ld. at 1464. 
6. ld. The investors were also given financial projections for the propoeed beaver 
investment. The projf:Ctions showed substantial income tax loaaes during the first six or 
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beavers and $2,400 per nonproven pair. II In each case, tile tax-
payer agreed to make a cash down payment and to give a prom-
issory note for the balance of the contract price.' The contracts 
included an option that after the fourth year the principal could 
be repaid in beavers, and that the value of the beavers used to 
repay the notes would be equal to the original stated contract 
price for the beavers.1o As a result of this option the taxpayers 
were only required to make cash payments of about 12 % of the 
stated contract price, and the remainder could be paid in bea-
vers.ll At the same time that these taxpayers were purchasing 
beavers for $1,200 and $1,750 per animal, the sellers were 
purchasing beavers for prices ranging between $16 and $250 per 
anima1.12 
All of the taxpayers, except Byrant, repaid with beavers as 
soon as their contracts allowed them to.13 Each taxpayer took 
depreciation and interest deductions, and the investment tax 
credit, using a tax basis in the beavers equal to the stated con-
tract price.u Several of the taxpayer&' beavers died or were dis-
posed of during the period in question, however the taxpayers 
did not report investment tax credit recapture during this 
period. III 
The Commissioner disallowed part of the depreciation and 
interest deductions and determined that the investment tax 
credit should be recaptured. III He determined that some of the 
taxpayers had additional capital gains and income from the sale 
of beavers, and also assessed an additional tax against the tax-
payers for negligent failure to report investment tax credit 
recapture.17 
8. Id. Bryant paid $3.250 per proven pair (those that have produced offspring) and 
$2,250 per nonproven pair (those that have not produced offspring). Id. 
9. Id. The notes bore interest at a stated rate and required annual principal pay-
ments of a stated amount. Id. 
10.Id. 
11. Id. Bryant actually paid $7,450 on 8 $52,000 stated contract price; Hartman: 
$7,344 on a $61,200 stated contract price; Webber: $14,000 on 8 $109,200 stated contract 
price; and Wohl: $6,900 on 8 $68,800 stated contract price. Id. 
12. Id. at 1465. 
13. Id. at 1464. Bryant continued to repay with money. Id. 
14. Id. at 1464·65. 
15. Id. at 1465. 
16.Id. 
17. Id. The additional assessment was under 26 U.S.C.§ 6653(8) (1982). See infra 
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The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's determination of 
deficiencies in the claimed federal tax liabilities of these taxpay-
ers. 18 The Tax Court denied the investment in beavers to the 
extent the stated contract price exceeded the fair market value 
of the beavers. III Therefore, the court held that the taxpayers' 
basis in the beavers and the amount of indebtedness were lim-
ited to the fair market value of the beavers.2o The Tax Court 
disallowed the taxpayers' depreciation and interest deductions 
and required recapture of their investment tax credit to the ex-
tent that each was not supported by the basis or debt as deter-
mined by the Tax Court.21 The Tax Court also affirmed the 
Commissioner's assessment of an addition to each taxpayer's tax 
for negligent failure to report investment tax credit recapture.22 
The taxpayers consolidated their cases and appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit. 
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision. The 
court first analyzed the basis of the investment, since the allowa-
ble depreciation and investment tax credit depend on the tax 
basis.23 The general rule is that the basis of property for tax pur-
poses is the cost of the property.24 However, the Ninth Circuit 
noted that courts have determined that in certain circumstances 
when a taxpayer's stated cost for an asset does not reflect its 
true economic value, the stated cost will be ignored for purposes 
of determining the basis of the asset.25 
note 49. 
18. Bryant, 790 F.2d at 1465. 
19.1d. 
20.ld. 
21. Id. The Tax Court determined the fair market value of the beavers to be $200 
per proven beaver, $137 per nonproven beaver, and $29 per yearling. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Bryant v. Commissioner, 790 F.2d 1463, 1465 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing 26 U.S.C.§§ 
38, 46(c)(I)(A), and 167(g». 
24. Bryant, 790 F.2d at 1465 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 1012 (1982». 
25. Bryant, 790 F.2d at 1465 (citing Estate of Franklin v. Comm'r, 544 F.2d 1045 
(9th Cir. 1976) (basis does not include that portion of nonrecourse debt that unreasona-
bly exceeds the value of the underlying property); Lemmen v. Comm'r, 77 T.C. 1326, 
1348 (1981) (basis does not include that portion of the stated purchase price of an asset 
that exceeds the value of the asset, if peculiar circumstances induce the taxpayer to pay 
more for the asset than its value». 
16
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The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court's application 
of the rationale used in Lemmen v. Commissioner.2s In Lemmen, 
the Tax Court rejected the use of the purchase price of the cat-
tle for basis purposes, because the seller had an incentive to in-
flate that amount.27 In Bryant, the Tax Court found that the 
stated purchase price for the beavers did not reflect :':le taxpay-
ers' t.rue economic cost in the beavers.2s The Tax Court found 
that because the taxpayers could use beavers (at the original in-
flated value) to pay the major portion of their promissory notes, 
they had no incentive to obtain the lowest possible price.211 In 
fact, the taxpayers had an incentive to agree to inflated prices to 
obtain favorable tax benefits.30 Because of these peculiar circum-
stances the Ninth Circuit held that the taxpayers' basis in their 
beavers was limited to the fair market value.31 
The Tax Court rejected the taxpayers' argument that they 
had an incentive to obtain the best possible price for the beavers 
because they were personally obligated on their promissory 
notes.33 The debt could be repaid in beavers and there was little 
chance that the taxpayers would not be able to repay the debt in 
beavers because if the beavers died during the first year they 
would be replaced. all The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Tax 
Court's finding that the taxpayers were not personally at risk on 
the debt.M 
For some unexplained reason, Bryant continued to pay in 
26. Bryant, 790 F.2d at 1465 (citing Lemmen v. Comm'r), 77 T.C. 1326, 1327 
(1981». In Lemmen, a taxpayer purchased two herds of cattle. The seller agreed to 
maintain and care for the cattle in exchange for some of the calves produced during the 
term of the contract. Lemmen, 77 T.C. at 1327. Because the cattle were depreciable and 
service contracts are not, the Tax Court determined that the taxpayer had incentive to 
inflate the price of the cattle.ld. After stating the general rule that basis equals cost, the 
Tax Court held that this rule does not apply where the transaction is not conducted at 
arms-length or where a transaction is based on peculiar circumstances which influenced 
the purchaser to agree to a price in excess of the property's fair market value.ld. In such 
cases, the basis of property for tax purposes may be limited to fair market value. ld. 
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cash even after he could have paid with beavers.3Ii However, the 
Ninth Circuit found that Bryant's purchase should be viewed at 
the time he entered into the transaction and therefore he should 
be treated the same as the other taxpayers.'s At the time of the 
purchase, Bryant agreed to an inflated purchase price, knew of 
the repayment option in beavers, and was aware of the tax ad-
vantages that would be obtained from the transaction.37 That 
Bryant did not exercise his option to repay in beavers did not 
affect the character of this transaction.M 
The Ninth Circuit next reviewed the Tax Court's determi-
nation of fair market value for the beavers. The Tax Court re-
lied on the contemporaneous wholesale purchases by the sellers 
in these contracts.U They were purchasing beavers for $16 to 
$250 each.40 Using tllese prices and by viewing the entire record, 
the Tax Court determined the fair market value to be $200 per 
proven beaver, $137 per nonproven beaver, and $29 per 
yearling. 41 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the determination of fair market 
value.·s It agreed with the Tax Court's finding that the taxpay-
ers' expert estimates were unreliable because they did not take 
into account the contemporaneous sales of beavers at substan-
tially lower prices.43 The Ninth Circuit stated that contempora-
neous sales are highly probative of value"· The majority of these 
contemporaneous sales were arm's length transactions, not dis-
tress sales, and thus were a good indication of value. U 
Limiting the taxpayers' basis to the fair market value of the 
beavers resulted in some of the taxpayers having paid principal 
35.1d. 









44. ld. (citing Estata of Franklin v. Comm'r, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048 n. 4 (9th Cir. 
1976); Narver v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 53, 96-97 (l980), aff'd, 670 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1982)}. 
45. Bryant, 790 F.2d at 1467. 
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amounts in cash for which they would receive no tax benefits,,6 
The Tax Court found that this result reflected the economic re-
alities of these transactions,,7 The Ninth Circuit agreed, con-
cluding that it was reasonable that a part of the purchase price 
for the investment was originally paid for the assumed true 
benefits.48 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding 
that the Commissioner sustained his burden of proof that tax-
payers Hartman, Webber, and Wohl negligently failed to report 
investment tax credit recapture.·· A mere showing that the tax 
was not paid is not enough to prove negligence for this purpose, 
but, the Commissioner also showed that the taxpayers were so-
phisticated businessmen who were aware of the recapture provi-
sions.110 The Ninth Circuit rejected Hartman's argument that 
failure to report investment tax credit recapture was not negli-
gent because he received a replacement beaver for each that 
died.III The Ninth Circuit found that Hartman's statement con-
stituted an admission.1I2 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Bryant v. Commissioner, the Internal Revenue Service 
looked beyond the form or actual language used in a transaction, 
to its substance or true economic reality. The use of specific 
terms or prices in a contract will not always be determinative in 
computing tax liability. Where express terms do not reflect the 
true economic cost of an investment, the Internal Revenue Ser-





William K. Peterson· 
49. Id. at 1467·68 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 6653(a) (1982) which imposes an addition to 
tax for any underpayment of tax which is the result of negligence or intentional disre-
gard of the rules or regulations). 
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